This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
Introduction
This paper examines a simple model of competing auction sites to give some insights into the concentration of auction markets. In our model, there are B ex-ante identical buyers, each with unit demand, and S sellers, each with a single unit of the good to sell and a reservation value of zero. At the start of the model, buyers and sellers simultaneously choose between two possible locations. Buyers then learn their private values for the good, and a uniform-price auction is held at each location. This is a very stark model, but we believe that it provides some useful insights, and that it serves as a benchmark case for richer and more realistic models.
In the last few years there have been a number of high-profile battles between competing auction sites. In 1998 and 1999, Yahoo! and Amazon, among others, launched online auction sites to compete with eBay. In 1999, literally hundreds of firms set up business-to-business auction sites. In the off-line world, Bonham's recently engineered the merger of what may have been the third, fourth, and fifth largest fine arts auction houses in the world in an attempt to build a viable challenger to Sotheby's and Christie's.
These battles have often ended with a single overwhelming winner. For example, Yahoo!'s U.S. auction revenues are estimated to be at most 5 percent of eBay's and Amazon's are even lower. 1 In Japan, things tipped the other way: eBay entered five months after Yahoo!, was never able to garner a significant market share, and abandoned the market in February 2002. The traditional fine arts auction market exhibits a less extreme and perhaps more intriguing form of concentration: Christie's and Sotheby's have jointly dominated the market for a century or more. 2 The market has not tipped against either of the leaders, each of which has come back from periods when it was somewhat behind, but no third firm has been able to challenge the leaders.
Why might auction activity concentrate? Some previous models have been built around an assumption of a preference for variety. 3 Our analysis starts from a simpler premise: A seller will choose the auction site where her expected price is highest, and a buyer will choose the auction site where his expected consumer surplus is highest. These preferences are largely opposed (high prices vs. low prices) so that the concentration of auction activity cannot be explained by a simple reference to network externalities. However, we show that sellers' and buyers' preferences are not completely opposed, because larger markets typically provide greater expected surplus per participant. We refer to this as the scale effect or efficiency effect; it makes concentration at a single auction site efficient, and so pushes the market toward concentration. 4 Despite the scale effect, our model does not always tip to complete concentration, because of an offsetting force we call the market impact effect. When a seller contemplates a switch from Market 1 to Market 2 she takes into account that her joining Market 2 will increase the seller-buyer ratio there, and thereby lower the expected price. 5 The market impact effect is present in any model with a finite number of agents, and favors equilibrium multiplicity: If the decrease in price in Market 2 that results from a seller switching from Market 1 to Market 2 is large enough to offset Market 2's initial price advantage, then sellers in 1. Yahoo! abandoned its European auction operations in May 2002. 2. The U.S. Department of Justice estimated that in 1999 the combined market share of Christie's and Sotheby's was 90 percent. The two firms achieved prominent positions by the early nineteenth century. See Learmount (1985) . 3. These issues have been examined in a number of previous papers. For example, in Gehrig (1998) , Stahl (1982) , and Wolinsky (1983) , consumers prefer larger markets because they have a finer grid of available varieties. 4. The scale effect implies that it is inefficient for there to be more than one active market. Note that trade in a given market is always ex-post efficient; in contrast to the literature on the asymptotic efficiency of double auctions and other exchange mechanisms with a fixed set of traders, e.g., Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) , Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) , and Tatur (2001) . These papers study trade in settings where no admissible mechanism is ex-post efficient, and derive bounds on the rate at which the ex-post inefficiency disappears as the economy grows. 5. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) emphasize a related effect, the amount that a seller gains from attracting an extra buyer; they show that it is larger than the gain from implementing an optimal reserve price.
Market 1 may happy to stay in Market 1 while those in Market 2 are happy to stay in Market 2. Thus, whether the smaller market can survive depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects. As we will see, both effects become small as the markets grow, and since they both shrink at the same rate, neither one asymptotically dominates the other.
Our model can always account for a market being dominated by a single auction site. Our most striking conclusion, however, is that the model also has equilibria in which sites of quite different sizes coexist, and that the critical mass of buyers an auction site must attract to be viable increases proportionally with the total buyer population. To get the main ideas across more simply, many of our results will be about "quasi-equilibria," which differ from full equilibria only by not requiring that the numbers of agents in each market be integers. Section 3 defines the concept formally, and explains how the constraints that no agent wants to switch markets are related to whether the market impact effect is strong enough to outweigh the scale effect.
Section 4 analyzes the special case where buyers' valuations are uniformly distributed. We give explicit expressions for the strength of the market impact and scale effects, and find the quasi-equilibrium set. For any fraction between 1/4 and 3/4, there is always a quasi-equilibrium with that fraction of the buyers at auction Site 1. There can also be coexisting sites that are somewhat more different in size; just how unequal the two markets can be depends on the aggregate seller-buyer ratio, for reasons that we explain. We provide graphs illustrating how the set is determined by four curves. We also prove a result about full equilibria with coexisting sites. The result that competing auction sites with a size ratio of 3:1 or 4:1 may both be viable is consistent both with the dominance of eBay (and of Yahoo! in Japan) and with the long-term coexistence of Christie's and Sotheby's: In the online auction markets, the new entrants seem to have never reached the necessary size, while in the art market the two firms' relative market shares appear to have remained within the bounds that our result prescribes, and no third firm has ever achieved the requisite critical mass.
Section 5 contains a more general investigation of ex-ante payoffs and scale effects in single auctions. We provide some general results about large markets providing higher payoffs than small ones, derive asymptotic approximations to the buyers' and sellers' payoffs when the number of agents is large, and show that the ex-ante inefficiency of an auction with N participants (that is, its per capita payoff compared to a larger auction with the same seller-buyer ratio) and the market impact effect both decline at rate 1/N. us to appeal to a general result in Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and conclude that (when the number of buyers and sellers is large) the model has a large number of quasi-equilibria with two active auction sites. An interesting aspect of the quasi-equilibrium set is that the critical mass of buyers that an auction site must attract to be viable increases proportionately with increases in the total buyer population.
Section 7 extends our model to allow the competing auction sites to set prices. 7 As in the standard models of competing firms selling goods which provide network externalities, a critical factor is how buyers and sellers coordinate after the auction sites post prices. Without added assumptions, the model predicts that fees charged by the auction site can lie in a broad range, and that the possibilities for coexistence are as in our base model. If one adds the assumption that buyers and sellers always coordinate on an equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal for them, the range of possible fees is much smaller, but the scope for multiple sites of different sizes coexisting is not reduced. Our analysis differs from past work on competition in auction rules in a number of ways. McAfee (1993) , Peters and Severinov (1997) , and Burguet and Sakovics (1999) study models in which buyers choose among auction sites, each of which has a single seller. These papers only examine equilibria in which buyers mix symmetrically, which rules out equilibria supported by market impact effects. Jullien (2001, 2003) study a model of sites that try to attract participants on both sides of an interaction, and show that allowing negative prices can reduce the set of equilibria. They assume a particular specification of the payoffs that incorporates the idea that larger markers offer more "varieties" and hence better matches, and they have a continuum of participants on both sides of the interaction, which eliminates the market impact effect.
Section 8 examines another factor that might be thought to support concentration, namely market thinness. One interesting aspect of eBay listings is that most of them seem to be unique items; this may be an important common trait of fine art and online auctions.
The Model
In our model, there are B buyers, S sellers, and S units of a single good. The sellers are risk neutral, have zero reservation value, and are endowed with one 7. We consider only simple pricing schemes and not more complicated schemes as in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , where buyers and sellers may be offered contracts that only entail fees if a specified number of other buyers and sellers attend. 8. Peters and Severinov (1997) do discuss some potential implications of buyers' using asymmetric pure strategies in their conclusion. unit of the good.
9 Buyers receive utility from consuming one unit of the good. The buyers' values v are identically and independently distributed with a cumulative distribution function F, which has a three-times continuously differentiable density f that is positive on its support [0, b ] , with b allowed to be infinite. 10 We assume that the expected value Ev is finite. We model location choice with a two-stage game. In the first stage, which occurs before the buyers learn their valuations for the good, buyers and sellers simultaneously choose whether to attend Market 1 or Market 2. One situation in which buyers would choose locations before learning their valuations is when buyers need to go to the auction site and inspect the good to learn their valuation. Another situation where this assumption is appropriate is when the buyers are dealers who participate in many auctions, have time-varying idiosyncratic valuations due to inventory or other factors, and who choose a single auction site for all of their purchases because they can save on transactions costs or build a better reputation. In the second stage, buyers learn their valuations and a uniform price auction occurs in each market. Thus, if a market with S sellers and B buyers does not have excess supply, the price there is the S ϩ 1st highest of the B buyer values. We use p or v Sϩ1:B to denote this price. More generally, we denote the kth highest order statistic of a draw of n values as v k:n . 11 Our assumption that v has a finite expectation implies that the expectations of the order statistics are finite too. We write f k:n for the density of v k:n . We assume that S ϩ 1 Ͻ B so that if all agents go to a single market there is excess demand and so with probability one the market price is strictly positive. A seller's expected utility is just the expected price in the market he or she chooses, u s (S, B) ϭ E(v 
), which we define to be w (S, B) ; note that
9. Section 5 briefly discusses the extension to the case of a common positive reservation value. 10. The propositions of this section extend to distributions without densities, although some strict inequalities become weak, and the notation and proofs become a bit more complicated due to the need to account for ties. The assumption that f has a third derivative is used only in large-economy approximations. 11. This is a slight twist on the usual notation in textbooks, where the first-order statistic is the smallest.
Equilibrium Conditions: The Market Impact and Efficiency Effects
In this section we present a very simple result to illustrate that in our model whether two active auction sites can coexist (and how different in size they may be) depends on the relative strength of two factors: the efficiency advantage of a larger site and the adverse market impact that a buyer or seller has when he or she switches sites.
Consider the possibility of a pure strategy equilibrium with S 1 sellers and B 1 buyers in Market 1 and S 2 sellers and B 2 buyers in Market 2, where S 1 ϩ S 2 ϭ S and B 1 ϩ B 2 ϭ B. This will be an equilibrium if and only if five constraints are satisfied:
S 1 , S 2 , B 1 , and B 2 are nonnegative integers.
We will often find it convenient to ignore the integer part of the final constraint and give results characterizing what we call "quasi-equilibria." DEFINITION 1. A quasi-equilibrium is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (S 1 , S 2 , B 1 , B 2 ) with S 1 ϩ S 2 ϭ S and B 1 ϩ B 2 ϭ B that satisfy (S1), (B1), (S2), and (B2).
Our first result is an algebraically trivial restatement of the quasi-equilibrium conditions that provides a useful perspective on when they will and will not hold. PROPOSITION 1. A vector of nonnegative real numbers (S 1 , S 2 , B 1 , B 2 ) with S 1 ϩ S 2 ϭ S and B 1 ϩ B 2 ϭ B is a quasi-equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following four constraints:
The left-hand sides of the two stay-in-Market-1 conditions, (B1Ј) and (S1Ј), measure the market impact that agents have when they move to Market 2. The right-hand sides measure the degree to which Market 2 is more attractive to buyers and sellers, respectively, given the current division of buyers and sellers. Note that when S 1 ϭ S 2 and B 1 ϭ B 2 the right-hand sides of the four constraints are all zero, while the left-hand sides are all strictly positive; this reflects the fact that an equal split between the two sites is a strict equilibrium.
As we discuss in detail in Section 5, larger markets typically yield higher per capita payoffs, because they come closer to the ideal of allocating the good to a buyer if and only if his valuation is high. This scale effect implies that one or both of the right-hand sides of (B1Ј) and (S1Ј) will be positive when Market 2 is larger than Market 1. Proposition 1 says that equilibrium requires that the market impact effects offset the higher payoffs that a larger market provides.
As the markets become more different in size, the advantage of the larger market grows. How different in size the two sites can be in equilibrium will depend on how strong the scale effect is relative to the market impact effect. If the scale effect is strong and payoffs increase rapidly with increases in market size, then the smaller site will need to be nearly as large as the larger one to be viable. If they do not (or the market impact effects are extremely strong), then auction sites of very different sizes may be able to coexist.
The Model with Uniformly-Distributed Valuations
In this section we explicitly calculate the efficiency and market impact effects and derive the implications for the coexistence of auction sites of different sizes under the assumption that buyer valuations are uniformly distributed. Qualitatively, the main conclusions are that markets of quite different sizes can coexist, that an auction site does need a critical mass of participants to be viable, and that the critical mass is roughly a specified fraction of the number of participants at the larger auction site (independent of the total number of participants). The example is intended to provide a straightforward illustration of more general results we'll derive in the next section. The assumption of uniformly distributed valuations may also be a reasonable one to use to think about auctions for goods like beanie babies, where the option of purchasing from a retail store puts an upper bound on the amount that any buyer would bid at auction.
Quasi-Equilibria
The utility functions for uniformly distributed valuations are simple to derive: 
Proof. The ith lowest of n draws from a uniform distribution is distributed Beta(i, n Ϫ i ϩ 1) and has expectation i/(n ϩ 1) (see, e.g., David 1970 
Using these expressions it is easy to compare the payoffs of two markets with the same seller-buyer ratio. Note that although a larger market yields higher payoffs per capita, buyers are actually better off in the smaller market. Note also that the market impact of adding another buyer is strongest when S/B is near to 1. 
.
The payoff advantage/disadvantage of the larger market for the sellers/ buyers is
(b) The market impact effects for both j ϭ 1 and j ϭ 2 are given by
Proof. The results follow immediately from the formulas in Proposition 2. ᮀ To determine how different in size two viable auction sites can be when the total number of buyers and sellers are B and S, respectively, it is sufficient to find the smallest and largest values of B 1 for which the market impact effect is strong enough to outweigh the payoff advantage of the larger market. Note that when trying to construct an equilibrium, it may be helpful to place relatively more buyers in the larger market, so that the seller's market impact need only outweigh a fraction of the larger market's efficiency advantage, rather than something that is larger than the efficiency advantage.
The exact formula for the critical mass of buyers necessary to make an auction site viable is too complicated to be enlightening. Proposition 4 gives an accurate and intuitive approximation. Roughly, the proposition says that the fraction of the buyers that the smaller auction site must attract to be viable is about (1/4)(1 Ϫ S/B). When S/B is small this means that an auction site must attract about one-quarter of the buyers to survive. When S/B is close to one it implies that a site with a tiny fraction of the participants can survive alongside a much larger site. 
Sketch of Proof.
Intuitively, one might expect that the binding constraints determining whether (S 1 , S Ϫ S 1 , B 1 , B Ϫ B 1 ) is a quasi-equilibrium are always (S1) and (B1) when B 1 Ͻ B/2, i.e., that the binding constraint is to keep participants from leaving the smaller, less efficient market. It turns out that this is not quite right, but it is true that the set of values of B 1 with B 1 Ͻ B/2 for which there is some S 1 that gives a quasi-equilibrium is indeed the set of B 1 for which (S1) and (B1) can be satisfied simultaneously. The first step in our proof (presented in the Appendix) is a lemma showing that this is true in any model satisfying three conditions: a monotonicity condition requiring that sellers (buyers) like sites with more buyers (sellers) and fewer sellers (buyers); a "large-market-efficiency" condition that requires that either sellers or buyers (or both) prefer Site 2 to Site 1 if Site 2 has more buyers; and a set of boundary conditions. We show that the model with uniformly distributed buyer values satisfies these three conditions. All that is required to complete the proof is then to analyze the conditions that are required for the (S1) and (B1) constraints to hold simultaneously. We show that B គ 1 is the solution to a particular quadratic equation and derive the bounds given in the proposition by approximating the solution.
ᮀ
Here is a rough intuition for the role of the aggregate seller/buyer ratio S/B ϭ ␥ in the limiting value of B គ 1 . When both markets are large, the market impact effects are small, so the seller/buyer ratios in each market must be about the same. From Proposition 3 we know that on a per-buyer basis the scale advantage is about 0.5␥(1 Ϫ ␥)(1/B 1 Ϫ 1/B 2 ). Since (S1) and (B1) hold with equality, both buyers and sellers are better off in the larger market. To have a quasi-equilibrium, the scale advantage must be offset by the market impacts that buyers and sellers have when moving to the larger market. Proposition 3 shows that the seller's market impact is about 1/B 2 , and the buyer's is about ␥ 2 /B 2 . Hence, the "best" way (for the purpose of constructing an equilibrium) to satisfy both (S1) and (B1) is to choose the seller-to-buyer ratio so that the large market's payoff advantage for a buyer is about ␥ 2 times as large as the large market's payoff advantage for a seller. A few calculations show that this is consistent with the size of the scale advantage if (1 ϩ ␥)/(1 Ϫ ␥) Ն 2(B 2 Ϫ B 1 )/B 1 ; this is equivalent to our conclusion that for large B, B 2 can be about (3 ϩ ␥)/4.
Illustrative Figures
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the structure of the equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium sets for the uniform distribution with ten buyers and five sellers. Figure 1 graphs the fractions of sellers in Market 1 that make buyers and sellers exactly indifferent between the two markets against the fraction of buyers in Market 1. The solid curve, which is the locus where buyers' utility is equal in both markets, lies above the dotted curve, which is the locus where sellers' utility is equalized in both markets, when B 1 Ͻ B/2. The unique intersection of the curves is at B 1 ϭ B/2. If buyers and sellers did not adversely affect prices when moving FIGURE 1. Equal utility curves (ten buyers and five sellers).
to the other market, the only quasi-equilibrium with split markets would be an unstable equilibrium with an exactly 50-50 split between the two markets. Figure 2 graphs the values of S 1 /S for which the (B1), (B2), (S1), and (S2) constraints hold with equality for the same utility functions as in Figure 1 . The quasi-equilibrium set is the parallelogram-shaped region in the center of the figure below the curves where (S1) and (B2) hold with equality and above the curves where (S2) and (B1) hold with equality. In this example, quasi-equilibria exist whenever the smaller market has at least 11 percent of the buyers (meaning B 1 is at least 1.1). We have placed small stars in the figure at points within the quasi-equilibrium set where the numbers of buyers and sellers are both integers. These are the equilibria. In an equilibrium the smaller market can have two buyers and one seller or four buyers and two sellers. There is no equilibrium with three or five buyers in the smaller market. With three buyers in the smaller market, for example, then there are a range of values of S 1 near 1 1 2 which satisfy the quasi-equilibrium conditions. None of these allocations, however, satisfy the integer constraints-sellers would be unwilling to stay in small market if there were two sellers, while buyers would be unwilling to stay in a market if there was only one seller.
To illustrate how markedly the scale effect declines with the size of the market, Figure 3 graphs the equal-buyer-utility and equal-seller-utility curves for a model with 30 buyers and 15 sellers and a uniform distribution of seller valuations (as in Figure 1 ). The curves are much closer together than the curves in Figure 1 . Sellers are indifferent when prices are equal in the two markets. The FIGURE 2. Quasi-equilibrium set (ten buyers and five sellers).
closeness of the two curves reflects that efficiency differences are fairly small and can only offset a small difference in price. Figure 4 graphs the four curves that bound the quasi-equilibrium set in this case. One interesting thing to note is that the range of market sizes in the quasi-equilibrium set is very similar to that in Figure 2 : Here a quasi-equilibrium exists whenever at least 12 percent of the buyers are in the small market, as compared to the 11 percent in Figure 2 . The quasi-equilibrium set looks much flatter in the S-dimension. This reflects that the market impact is much smaller and hence buyer and seller utility (the latter of which is equal to the price) have to be more nearly equal in the two markets in equilibrium. The stars in the figure illustrate that there are nonetheless a substantial number of true equilibria.
True Equilibria
So far we have been ignoring the constraint that the numbers of buyers and sellers in each marker should be an integer. With a small number of traders it may be that only a few ratios of markets sizes are possible. However, one would expect these integer problems to become less important in large markets. Our next result is a demonstration that for any "target" value for the seller-buyer ratio and any target value for B 1 /B, one can for any sufficiently large B always find an S with S/B close to the target for which the model with S sellers and B buyers has a true equilibrium with the fraction of buyers at 
and any Ͼ 0, there exists B គ such that for all B Ͼ B គ there is an equilibrium
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof first constructs a quasi-equilibrium with equal prices that approximates the target ratios, but where only B 1 and B 2 are guaranteed to be integers; we then use this partition to construct an integer-valued partition where all of the incentive constraints are satisfied but prices are only approximately equal.
Ex-Ante Payoffs and Scale Effects in a Single Auction
This section drops the restriction to uniformly distributed buyer valuations and analyzes how ex-ante payoffs vary with market size in a single market. Under-standing this scale effect is important for determining when a larger market will drive out a smaller one, and we think it is also interesting in its own right. Consider a market with S sellers and B Ͼ S buyers. Ex-post efficiency requires that the buyers with the S highest values receive the good, so the expectation of the maximum possible total surplus is B Pr(v Ն v
); this surplus is realized by the uniform-price auction that we defined previously. Note that as the market grows, holding the buyerseller ratio fixed, the auction's outcome converges to a deterministic limit, with the good given to all buyers whose value exceeds the market-clearing price, which is v ϵ F
Ϫ1
(1 Ϫ S/B); another way of saying this is that the auction converges to the competitive equilibrium for the limiting continuum economy. Welfare per seller converges to the average of the buyer values on the range where value is at least the market price, E [v ͉ v Ն v(S/B) ]; denote this w ϱ (S/B).
PROPOSITION 6. With an efficient allocation of goods to buyers, the expected surplus per seller in a finite market with S sellers and B buyers is strictly less than the expected surplus per seller in a market with continua of buyers and sellers and the same seller-buyer ratio.
The idea of the proof is simply that the distribution of realized utility as a function of buyer's value in the large market first-order stochastically dominates the distribution in the small one. In both markets, buyers have the same probability of receiving the good, but in the small market, buyers do so in a less efficient way, as they sometimes receive the good when v Ͻ v.
Proof. Since we are holding the seller-buyer ratio fixed, it will be sufficient to prove that surplus per buyer is higher in the large market. Let c(v) be the buyer's probability of consuming the good in the finite market when his value is v. Then the expected surplus per buyer in the continuum market is E(v ͉ v Ն v) Pr(v Ն v) , and the expected surplus per buyer in the finite market is E (v ⅐ c(v) ). The difference in per buyer surplus between the large and small market is
The strict inequality follows from the fact that c(v) is strictly between 0 and 1 on for v ʦ (0, v), which in turn follows from the assumptions that B Ͼ S and the cumulative distribution of buyer values is strictly monotone. ᮀ
The next result extends the previous one by showing that the expected surplus per agent is monotone in market size.
PROPOSITION 7. If m and n are integers with m Ͻ n, then w(mS, mB) Ͻ w(nS, nB).
Proof. See Appendix. 12 We should emphasize that these results are about the expected per capita surplus, and do not imply that both buyers and sellers must become better off as the market grows, as the size of the market can influence the allocation of the surplus as well as its level. Indeed, we will see that there are cases where buyers strictly prefer smaller markets, holding the seller-buyer ratio fixed.
We now present results providing approximations to the payoffs obtained by buyers and sellers in large auctions. The results are asymptotic approximations relevant in the limit as the number of buyers and sellers grows with the seller-buyer ratio held fixed at ␥. This result may be of interest on its own; it will also be useful in our analysis of two competing large markets. 
hold uniformly in ␥ when B is large.
13
To see why something like this result might be true, consider the formula for the seller's utility u s (␥B, B):
As B 3 ϱ, the density term in brackets becomes increasingly concentrated around its maximum, which occurs at v ϭ v ϭ F
Ϫ1
(1 Ϫ ␥). Hence, u s (␥B, B) tends to F
(1 Ϫ ␥). Moreover, the tails of the density are bounded by an exponentially decreasing function of B. This observation and a change of 12. We thank Jonathan Weinstein for the proof of this proposition. variables lets us show that the rate at which the integral approaches its limit is determined by the behavior of F Ϫ1 ( y) around 1 Ϫ ␥, and this allows us to use a Taylor expansion of F
( y) to determine the rate of convergence. Since the integral of the third-order term of the Taylor expansion is already o(1/B), this rate depends only the first-and second-order derivatives of F.
One immediate consequence of Proposition 8 is a result on ex-ante efficiency: the (per-seller) inefficiency of a market relative to the continuum limit shrinks at rate 1/B.
Proof. The result follows immediately from
A second interesting consequence of Proposition 8 is that it illustrates that sellers and buyers have conflicting preferences about market size when the seller-buyer ratio is held fixed. The first term in the expressions for u s and u b are each agent's payoff in the continuum limit: the sellers' expected payoff approaches F
(1 Ϫ ␥) ϭ v and the buyers' expected payoff approaches
is not too negative, the term of order 1/B in the expression for the seller's utility is negative, and the corresponding term in the expression for the buyer's utility is positive. This implies that when comparing two large-markets sellers will prefer the larger market and buyers will prefer the smaller market.
14 Although the proposition only applies when the number of agents is sufficiently large, recall that under the uniform distribution (where f Ј(v) is identically 0) buyers always preferred a smaller market. Schwartz and Ungo (2002) provide a more general result along these lines, allowing both for a broad class of distributions and making comparisons across auctions with nonidentical seller-buyer ratios. 15 We believe that Proposition 8 extends to the case where all sellers have a common reservation value Ͼ 0, provided that is small enough that Ͻ v ϭ F
(1 Ϫ ␥). In this case, the reservation value is irrelevant in the continuum limit, and in finite markets the probability that a seller ends up keeping her unit goes to zero at an exponential rate. When Ͼ v, a positive fraction of sellers keep their units in the continuum limit, and the approximations in Proposition 8 fail. In either case, the size of the quasi-equilibrium set is determined by the relative sizes of the market impact and scale effects, but it is only in the case 14. Conversely, when f Ј( v) is sufficiently negative, sellers prefer the smaller market. 15. Schwartz and Ungo (2002) also discuss the implications this result may have for the mergers of auction houses if buyers have entry costs and a reduction in buyer utility could lead to lower buyer participation.
Ͻ
v that we know that the range of market sizes given in Proposition 10 still applies.
Competing Auction Sites in Large Economies
In this section we present two results characterizing the quasi-equilibrium set under general assumptions about the distribution of buyer valuations. Our main result examines what happens when the number of buyers and sellers is large.
The market impact effect plays a critical role in letting multiple auction sites coexist. We first present a simple impossibility result to illustrate this: A market of fixed finite size could not survive if agents had the opportunity to attend a market with a continuum of buyers and sellers instead. Let the finite market be Market 1, with numbers S 1 sellers and B 1 buyers, and let Market 2 have a continuum of participants with seller-buyer ratio S 2 /B 2 . The deterministic price p 2 in Market 2 is defined by 1 Ϫ F( p 2 ) ϭ S 2 /B 2 . A buyer or seller moving into the large market will have no effect on the price there, so for both markets to coexist it is necessary that the expected price in market 1 satisfies p 1 Ն p 2 (or else sellers move to Market 2) and that u b 1 Ն u b 2 (or else the buyers move).
PROPOSITION 9. There is no equilibrium in which trade takes place in both a continuum market and a finite one.
Proof. As before, let c(v) be the buyer's probability of consuming the good in the small market when her type is v.
) is the buyer's expected utility in the continuum market, and
is the buyer's expected utility in the finite market. Sellers are willing to remain in the finite market only if p 1 Ն p 2 . When this holds, however, we have
so that buyers are not willing to remain in the finite market. ᮀ
We now present the most important result of this section: a general result on the set of quasi-equilibria of large economies that complements our detailed analysis of the case of uniformly-distributed values. This result follows from Proposition 8 and a general result in Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) . That paper uses the following assumption to show that when the economy is large, the equilibrium with two equal-sized markets is not an isolated "knife-edge," but that instead there is a plateau of quasi-equilibria: CONDITION A4. There is a nonempty interval ⌫ ϭ [␥ គ , ␥ ] ʚ (0, ϱ) and twice continuously differentiable functions u* s , u * b , G s , and G b on ⌫ with du * s /d␥ Ͻ 0 and du* b /d␥ Ͼ 0 such that the approximations
hold uniformly in ␥ when B is large. 
PROPOSITION. (Ellison and
in the general formula for r in the previous theorem yields
ϩ 1ͯ ͪ ᮀ To illustrate Proposition 10, consider the uniform distribution. Here, we have r*(␥) ϭ max{͉3 Ϫ 2␥͉, ͉2 Ϫ 1/␥͉}. When ␥ Ͼ (5 Ϫ ͌ 17)/4 Х 0.22, the first term is larger and ␣*(␥) ϭ 1/2 Ϫ 1/2(3 Ϫ 2␥) ϭ (1 Ϫ ␥)/(3 Ϫ 2␥). When ␥ is close to 1, this is close to 0, so the conclusion of Proposition 10 in this case is close to the characterization of the quasi-equilibrium set given by Proposition 4. For small ␥, ␣*(␥) ϭ 1/2 Ϫ 1/2(1/␥ Ϫ 2) ϭ (1 Ϫ 3␥)/ (2 Ϫ 4␥), which is close to 1/2 when ␥ is close to zero. Hence, Proposition 10 only establishes the existence of a tiny quasi-equilibrium plateau, whereas we know from Proposition 4 that the fraction of buyers that can be in market 1 in a quasi-equilibrium is about (1/4 , 3/4). The difference is due to Proposition 10's only considering the possibility of quasi-equilibria with equal seller-buyer ratios is the two markets.
Next consider the exponential distribution, f(v) ϭ exp(Ϫv) for v Ն 0. Here v(␥) ϭ Ϫln ␥, and
As ␥ 3 1 the fraction of buyers that can be in market 1 in a quasiequilibrium converges to (0, 1) as in the uniform case; as ␥ 3 0, the range of quasi-equilibria from Proposition 10 is (1/4, 3/4). The 2002 version of this paper analyzes the exponential case in more detail; it shows that when the sellerbuyer ratios are allowed to differ in the two markets, the share of buyers in Market 1 in a quasi-equilibrium can be the slightly smaller number (1 Ϫ ␥)/4 . Proposition 10 has the advantage of applying for any distribution of valuations, but it has several limitations relative to our analysis of uniformlydistributed valuations: It provides sufficient conditions for the existence of quasi-equilibria but not necessary ones; it doesn't describe the equilibrium set for small numbers of buyers and sellers; and it doesn't tell us when the requirement that equilibrium involves whole numbers in each market can be satisfied. The only way we know of to provide that sort of more detailed characterization is to specify a particular distribution for buyer values and perform the analogs of the explicit calculations of Section 4.
Price Competition
The auction sites in our base model are not competing in price; we have implicitly assumed they set a price of 0. Our results also describe what happens when competing auction sites charge any common price that is not so large as to drive away buyers or sellers. This is a reasonable approximation to many of the real-world examples discussed in the introduction. Christie's and Sotheby's were recently convicted of price-fixing in connection with their joint adherence to a complex schedule of buyers' and sellers' commissions. 16 Amazon also matched eBay's multitiered schedule of listing fees and commissions when it entered. In other cases, however, there has been price competition: Yahoo! Auctions initially charged no listing fees, and Phillips did not immediately match Sotheby's and Christie's 1975 price increase. 17 In this section, we examine an extension of our base model with one extra stage: Before the sellers and buyers choose between sites, the sites simultaneously announce the listing fees that they will charge sellers.
As in models of firms' competing to sell products that provide network externalities, little can be said about prices or market shares in this model without some extra assumptions about how the equilibrium multiplicity is resolved in the game between the buyers and sellers that follows the sites' setting fees. 16. The firms were also accused of price-fixing in 1975 when they simultaneously changed their commission schedules, instituting a 10 percent buyer's premium. 17. See Learmount (1985) , p. 162.
Proof. For part (a) suppose that the equilibrium selection rule in the second stage is that buyers and sellers all go to auction Site 1 whenever Site 1 sets a price of p and that all buyers and sellers go to auction Site 2 whenever Site 1 sets any other price. For part (b) assume that the selection rule is that the S 1 sellers and B 1 buyers choose market 1 whenever market 1 if both sites set a price of p, and that if one site deviates to a price other then p then no buyers or sellers go to it. ᮀ
The most common equilibrium refinement in the duopoly network externality literature is to assume that consumers coordinate on the equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal for them. In that literature, it leads to Bertrand-like competition, and implies that all consumers will buy from one firm. Such a strong refinement does not seem reasonable in the competing auctions context: Yahoo! did not attract all buyers and sellers despite substantially undercutting eBay. Moreover, in this setting the refinement need not eliminate equilibria with two active markets. For example, in the model with five sellers, ten buyers, and uniformly distributed values we saw that the equilibrium set consisted of all splits with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 sellers and twice as many buyers as sellers in Market 1. These equilibria are not Pareto-ranked: buyers are best off in the smallest market and sellers in the largest market. Hence, even with a Pareto optimality refinement one could support equilibria with zero listing fees and any split of the sellers by assuming that any change in the listing fee would cause all buyers and sellers to switch to the other auction site. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) note that an alternate way to shrink the equilibrium set is to allow firms to use more sophisticated pricing instruments. This would dramatically alter the outcome in our model as well. As Schwartz and Ungo (2002) note, an equilibrium with two active markets always yields less expected surplus than an equilibrium with all buyers and sellers at a single auction site. Hence, given any strategy profile in which both sites are active, either site could deviate and make individualized offers to each buyer and seller, promising to pay them the positive or negative amount that would make them better off than they would be under the original strategy profile if all buyers and sellers come are attracted by that site, and guaranteeing that the site will attract all buyers and sellers by promising to make a very large payment to each of them if not all buyers and sellers come. The fact that attracting all buyers and sellers to a single site maximizes total surplus implies that this deviation produces greater profits (assuming both sites' profits were nonnegative in the original profile).
Thin Markets
We now test the robustness of the conclusion that auction sites of quite different sizes can coexist to the possibility that markets are thin, in the sense of there being very few items available for trade. Specifically, we specialize again to uniformly distributed values and suppose that each seller only has the good with a probability q Ӷ 1. We suppose that buyers and sellers choose markets before either the buyer's uncertainty or the seller's is resolved; we think of q as the probability that the seller has a good of the appropriate type to sell in the current period.
The seller's expected utility when he attends a market with S other sellers and B buyers, and when he has a good to sell is 1 Ϫ (qS ϩ 1)/(B ϩ 1) . If qS is sufficiently small (qS Ͻ 4/B 2 will do), sellers will never be willing to go to Site 1 if B 1 Ͻ B 2 . This is intuitive: when q is very small, each seller expects to be a monopolist at either site, and so prefers to be at the site with more buyers.
However, when qS 3 0 there are vanishingly few objects offered for sale, so this is a fairly extreme version of a thin market. One less extreme version of thinness would be to consider a model with exactly three sellers, each of whom has an object to sell (so we go back to q ϭ 1.) Here, there would be equilibria with two active markets even when the number of buyers is very large. Specifically, one can show using the payoff functions given in Section 4 that S 1 ϭ 1, S 2 ϭ 2, B 1 ϭ (2B Ϫ 1)/5 and B 2 ϭ (3B ϩ 1)/5 is an equilibrium of the model with uniformly distributed values whenever 2B Ϫ 1 is a multiple of 5.
Concluding Comments
We would like to develop a model that incorporates adverse selection in the market-participation decision. Our causal empiricism suggests that a major reason that the Amazon and Yahoo! auction sites have struggled is that they tried to compete by having zero listing fees. This led to their listings being filled up with products being offered by nonserious sellers with very high reserve prices. If we suppose that there is a cost to reading web pages, or to investigating the quality of a good and/or its seller, then buyers will prefer to frequent sites with a high percentage of good listings-listings by reputable sellers who have high-quality goods and are willing to sell them at a reasonable price. In this case, a market with too many bad sellers might collapse. However, two markets might be able to coexist if sites have some background flow of captive traffic from people who click in from Yahoo! or Amazon without considering another auction site.
The issue of reserve prices poses a problem for a would-be new market site: On the one hand, when the market is new, sellers may not expect to get competitive bids, and so be unwilling to participate unless they can protect themselves with a reserve price. However, while the imposition of a uniform reserve price in a market can increase the payoff of sellers for any fixed buyer-seller ratio, it lowers the overall efficiency of the market, and so we would expect it to reduce the viability of the new market.
We would like to point out that it is not necessary to assume that both buyers and sellers recognize that they have a market impact to obtain our conclusions; it is sufficient that one side does. (This is a consequence of Lemma A2.)
Finally we would like to note that while the paper has analyzed competition between two markets, its analysis also applies to the study of 2M markets, M "smaller" and M "larger." Such a configuration will be an equilibrium provided that it is an equilibrium for M ϭ 1. This shows that any tendency to have only two markets, as opposed to more, must be due either to relatively small numbers of participants, or to agglomerative forces not captured by our model. One reason why such configurations may be less common in practice is that our model suggests they could be quite fragile-if two or more of the markets merge, the merged entity may be sufficiently large relative to the others so as to attract all of the patrons of every small market.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. The "only if" direction is trivial. To prove the "if" direction we use a lemma that shows that, under three regularity conditions, it suffices to work with two of the four incentive constraints. 
͑A2-Monotonicity͒
Then, there exists an S 1 such that (S 1 , S Ϫ S 1 , B 1 , B Ϫ B 1 ) is a quasi-equilibrium if and only if there exists an S 1 such that (S 1 , S Ϫ S 1 , B 1 , B Ϫ B 1 ) satisfies the (B1) and (S1) constraints.
A proof of this lemma is given in Ellison and Fudenberg (2002) . Here is a sketch: If one fixes an allocation S 1 , B 1 satisfying (S1) and (B1), then large market efficiency implies that either the buyers or the sellers (or both) are getting higher utility in Market 2. If both, then (S2) and (B2) are obviously satisfied and we are done. If only (B2) is satisfied, then the allocation we started with is not a quasi-equilibrium. In this case, however, we can add sellers to Market 1 until (S2) is just satisfied. At this allocation sellers get higher utility in the small market. The other three constraints therefore hold: (B1) continues to hold because we've made Market 1 more attractive; (S1) holds because sellers are doing better in Market 1; and (B2) holds because buyers are doing better in Market 2 (which follows from large market efficiency). The case when only (S2) holds is similar.
It is clear from inspection that the utility functions for the model with uniform valuations satisfy (A1) and (A2). For (A3) note that we can rewrite the buyer utility as
18 thus if prices are higher in Market 1 and B 1 is smaller than B 2 , then buyers must be better off in Market 2. Hence, Lemma A1 applies and we need only determine the range of values of B 1 for which the (S1) and (B1) constraints can be simultaneously satisfied.
The (S1) constraint can be rewritten as S 1 ϩ 1 Յ c(B 1 ϩ 1), where c ϭ (S ϩ 3)/(B ϩ 2). For a given B 1 , this holds for all S 1 below the line where the constraint holds with equality. The monotonicity of the buyer's utility function implies that if the (B1) constraint holds for a given S 1 , then it holds for all larger S 1 . Hence, there is an S 1 satisfying both (S1) and (B1) if and only if (B1) is satisfied when (S1) holds with equality.
When (S1) holds with equality, the (B1) constraint, which is
Further algebra shows that if we define z ϭ (B 1 ϩ 1)/(B ϩ 2) and f ϭ 1/(B ϩ 2), this can be rewritten as Subtracting the right-hand side from the left yields the quadratic equation
Rearranging terms gives
An exact bound on the quasi-equilibrium set is obtained by letting z be the smallest value for which (aЉ) holds with equality and setting B គ 1 ϭ z(B ϩ 2) Ϫ 1. The fact that (B1) is satisfied at (B 1 , S 1 ) ϭ (B/2, S/2 ϩ 1/2) (where (S1) holds with equality) implies that the expression (aЉ) is positive at z ϭ 1 ⁄2 . Hence, the smallest z satisfying (aЉ) is just the smaller root of the quadratic equation obtained by setting the left-hand side of the inequality equal to zero. An explicit formula for B គ 1 is therefore easy to obtain.
To obtain the approximations to B គ 1 given in the Proposition, we note that writing Q(z) for the term in the first set of square brackets in (aЉ) and L(z, f ) for the remainder of the left-hand side, the quadratic is of the form 
there is a quasi-equilibrium (S 1 , S 2 , B 1 , B 2 ) with u s (S 1 , B 1 ) ϭ u s (S 2 , B 2 ). Specifically, choosing S 1 and S 2 with (S 1 ϩ 1)/(B 1 ϩ 1) ϭ (S 2 ϩ 1)/(B 2 ϩ 1) gives such a quasi-equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma A2. When expected prices are equal, both seller constraints are satisfied. Equal prices also imply that ␥ ϭ (S i ϩ 1)/(B i ϩ 1) is the same in both markets, so (S 1 ϩ 1)(B 2 ϩ 1) ϭ (S 2 ϩ 1)(B 1 ϩ 1). Then by canceling terms equal to ␥ we can rewrite the buyer constraints as
Rewrite (aЈ) and (bЈ) as S i (B j ϩ 2) Ն S j B i , and add and subtract terms to obtain
Divide both sides by (B i ϩ 1)(B j ϩ 1)
Using the fact that prices are equal, this is equivalent to B i /B Յ 1/2 ϩ S/2B or
For any B 1 , B 2 that satisfy ‫,)ءء(‬ the buyer constraints are satisfied for the S 1 and S 2 that equate the expected prices in the two markets. The last step of the proof is to show that under ‫)ءء(‬ there must exist a pair S 1 , S 2 that does equate the expected prices. Holding B 1 , B 2 fixed, and setting S 2 ϭ S Ϫ S 1 , the difference in expected prices is
which is a linearly decreasing function of S 1 . When S 1 ϭ 0 the difference is proportional to S(B 1 ϩ 1) ϩ (B 1 Ϫ B 2 ); from ‫)ءء(‬ this is at least SB 1 Ͼ 0. Similarly when S 1 ϭ S the difference is proportional to ϪS(B 2 ϩ 1) ϩ (B 1 Ϫ B 2 ) Ͻ ϪSB 2 Ͻ 0. So there is a solution with 0 Ͻ S 1 , S 2 Ͻ S. ᮀ Proof of Proposition 5. We will first construct an equal-price partition (B 1 , B 2 , Ŝ 1 j , Ŝ 2 j ) that approximates the target ratios, but where only B 1 and B 2 are guaranteed to be integers; we will then use this partition to construct an integer-valued partition (B 1 , B 2 , S * 1 , S * 2 ) where all of the incentive constraints are satisfied but prices are only approximately equal.
Assume that ␣ Ͻ 1/2 , let ␥* ϭ ␥(B ϩ 2) / (B ϩ 2) , and ␣* ϭ ␣(B ϩ 2) / (B ϩ 2) , where x is the largest integer less than or equal to x, and x is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
19 Note that ␥* Յ ␥, and 1 Ϫ 2␣* Յ 1 Ϫ 2␣; since we have already assumed that ␥ Ͼ 1 Ϫ 2␣, we know that ␥* Ͼ 1 Ϫ 2␣* for B Ͼ 3/(␥ Ϫ (1 Ϫ 2␣) ) . Note also that for B sufficiently large we have ␣* Ͻ 1/2 .
Let v* ϭ min{␣*, 1 Ϫ 2␣*}, and let k ϭ 1/v* . Define B 1 ϭ ␣*(B ϩ 2) Ϫ 1, B 2 ϭ B Ϫ B 1 . For any nonnegative integer j, define ␥ j ϭ ␥* ϩ 2j/(B ϩ 2) and 
which is within of ␥ if B Ͼ 2k/ . If ␣* Ͻ 1 Ϫ 2␣*, then a similar calculation shows
this is also within of
The assumption that ␣ ʦ (1/2 Ϫ ␥/2, 1/2) and the fact that ␥ j and ␥ j are each larger than ␥ imply that for B large enough,
Thus Lemma A2 implies that each partition (B 1 , B 2 , Ŝ 1 j , Ŝ 2 j ) satisfies all four incentive constraints. If Ŝ 1 j is an integer for any j ʦ {0, 1, . . . , k} we are done. If not and if ␣* Ն 1 Ϫ 2␣* ϭ v*, let m be the smallest integer j with Ŝ 1
19. The case ␣ Ͼ 1/2 is symmetric. A separate argument is needed for ␣ ϭ 1/2 ; we omit this argument here but will provide it on request. ␣* ϭ v*. In either case let S* 1 ϭ Ŝ 1 m  and S * 2 ϭ S Ϫ S * 1 . We will now show that (B 1 , B 2 , S * 1 , S * 2 ) is an equilibrium; that is, the deviation of the partition from exactly equal prices (which is necessary to satisfy the integer constraint) is small enough that the incentive constraints are still satisfied. Since we set the number of sellers in Market 1 to be slightly higher than the number needed for equal prices, the constraints (B1)-that buyers are willing to stay in market 1-and (S2)-that sellers stay in Market 2-will be the easiest to check. For (B1), note that by Lemma A2, (B 1 , B ) has equal prices, the fact that
Therefore a seller gets a better expected price by staying in Market 2. The constraint that sellers are willing to stay in Market 1 requires that
or, using the facts that prices are equal at (B 1 ,
Since S* 1 Ϫ Ŝ 1 m ϭ Ŝ 2 m Ϫ S * 2 , we can rewrite this as
Finally we come to the constraint that buyers be willing to stay in Market 2. This is
which we can write as
When we ignored the integer constraint, the term in the brackets was equal to 1; the issue now is whether the integer partition keeps this term close enough to 1. Note that
Using the fact that (Ŝ 2 m ϩ 1)/(B 2 ϩ 1) ϭ (Ŝ 1 m ϩ 1)/B 1 ϩ 1) , we conclude that the incentive constraint is satisfied if
If we rewrite this as
, where x and y are defined as the two fractions inside of the large brackets, we see that a sufficient condition for incentive compatibility for large B is
By algebra similar to the proof of Lemma A2, the condition (S* 2 /B 2 ) (1 Ϫ ␦) Ն S* 1 /(B 1 ϩ 2) is equivalent to
We also know that the term (S* 2 ϩ 1)/(B 2 ϩ 1) in the right-hand side of ‫)ءء(‬ equals ␥ ϩ O(1/B). Therefore it will be sufficient to show that
) error term arises because ␦ is order 1/B.) Substituting the approximation for ␦ from ‫)ء(‬ into the expression ␦␥, and using the fact that ␦/B ϭ O(1/B 2 ) to replace 1 Ϫ ␦ by 1, it is sufficient to show that
The right-hand side of this expression is
Multiplying through by ␣(1 Ϫ ␣) B and collecting terms, we see that the constraint is satisfied if 2v* Յ ␥ ϩ 1 Ϫ 2␣ ϩ O(1/B). Since v* Յ 1 Ϫ 2␣ and v* Ͻ ␥, we conclude that the incentive constraint is satisfied for all sufficiently large B. ᮀ Proof of Proposition 7. One way to generate a sample Y M of mB draws from F is to first generate a sample Y N of nB i.i.d. draws, and then randomly select a subset of mB elements; we will use this method to relate the distributions of the order statistics of the two samples. Let q i be the probability that the ith highest draw from Y N is one of the mS highest elements of Y M . This probability is independent of the realized values of the order statistics; it depends only on which elements of Y N are chosen. In particular, for i ϭ 1 to mS, q i is simply the probability that the element in question is chosen, namely m/n ; for i ϭ mS ϩ 1 and thereafter each subsequent q i is strictly less than the preceding one since this i ϭ mS ϩ j will only be one of the mS highest elements if it is chosen and at least j of the higher realizations are not. Then 
S1
(B គ 1 (B)) for B ϭ 1, 2, . . . and z គ is a subsequential limit point of B គ 1 (B)/B then f (z គ) ϭ 0. Hence, it suffices to show that for some choice of the approximating function f the unique solution to f (z) ϭ 0 in (0, 1/2] is (1 Ϫ ␥)/4.
We approximate the equation for (S1) holding with equality using the formula noted earlier: 
Set Bf(z) equal to the function on the RHS without the error term. It can be checked that convergence of f (z) to the expression on the LHS is indeed locally uniform because the error term will not blow up as z is varied a little bit. Multiplying f (z) through by ␥z(1 Ϫ z) we find f (z) ϭ 0 if and only if 2␥z ϩ 2z Ϫ (1 Ϫ z) ϩ ␥(1 Ϫ z) ϩ z Ϫ ␥z ϭ 0, which reduces to z ϭ (1 Ϫ ␥)/4. ᮀ
